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Dominance and Competitive Bundling†
By Sjaak Hurkens, Doh-Shin Jeon, and Domenico Menicucci*
We study how bundling affects competition between two asymmetric 
multi-product firms. One firm dominates the other in that it produces 
better products more efficiently. For low (high) levels of dominance, 
bundling intensifies (relaxes) price competition and lowers (raises) 
both firms’ profits. For intermediate dominance levels, bundling 
increases the dominant firm’s market share substantially, thereby 
raising its profit while reducing its rival’s profit. Hence, the threat 
to bundle is then a credible foreclosure strategy. We also identify 
 circumstances in which a firm that dominates only in some markets 
can profitably leverage its dominance to other markets by tying all its 
products. (JEL D43, K21, L13, L41) 
Does bundling or tying intensify competition? This is a classic question addressed in the literature on competitive bundling. While Matutes and Regibeau (1988)
finds that bundling intensifies competition in a symmetric duopoly, Kim and Choi 
(2015) and Zhou (2017) find that bundling can soften competition in a  symmetric 
oligopoly when the number of firms is above a threshold that can be small. This paper 
contributes to a better understanding of how bundling affects price competition by 
considering an asymmetric duopoly in which one firm has symmetric dominance 
in all of its product markets.1 We say that firm A is dominant in a product market 
if A’s product gives a higher social surplus than its rival’s product.2 We obtain the 
following novel results: for low levels of dominance, bundling reduces each firm’s 
profit; for intermediate levels of dominance, bundling increases the dominant firm’s 
profit but reduces the rival’s profit; for high levels of dominance, bundling increases 
each firm’s profit.
1 Our model extends Matutes and Regibeau (1988) not only by allowing for dominance, but also by considering 
more general distributions of consumers’ locations and any number of products.
2 The higher surplus can represent higher quality or lower production cost.
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Our theoretical findings are relevant to antitrust policy. There are two widely 
publicized cases in which bundling dominant products was an issue. One is the 
General Electric (GE)/Honeywell merger case in which GE and Honeywell were 
dominant in the airplane engine and avionics market, respectively (Nalebuff 2002). 
The European Commission (EC) opposed the merger because of the concern that 
the merged entity would drive out rivals by practicing bundling. The other is  the 
 Google-Android case: in 2016, the EC accused Google of abuse of dominance by 
forcing  smartphone manufacturers using its Android operating system to pre-install 
Google Play and Google Search. The EC claimed that Google had more than 90 per-
cent market share in each of the three respective markets (i.e., licensable smart 
mobile operating systems, app stores for the Android mobile operating system, and 
general internet search services) and expressed concerns about “the practices to 
close off ways for rival search engines to access the market” (European Commission 
2016).
We compare price competition under independent pricing with price competition 
under pure bundling in a multidimensional Hotelling setting. In each product market, 
the firms are located at the opposite ends of the unit interval; consumers’ locations 
are distributed symmetrically around the center. The intuition for our results can be 
grasped by studying how bundling changes the relevant distribution of consumers 
and how dominance affects the location of the marginal consumers. Together, these 
factors affect the number of marginal consumers and the allocation of firms’ market 
shares, causing both demand elasticity and demand size effects.
What matters under bundling is the distribution of consumers’ average  locations. 
This distribution is (under general conditions) more peaked: it is thicker at the  center 
and thinner at the tails than the original distribution of locations.3 The  dominance 
level affects the location of the marginal consumers. As dominance increases, the 
location of the marginal consumers is closer to that of the dominated firm. In our 
baseline model, the dominant firm has the same dominance level in all  product 
 markets, so that the average dominance level, which matters under  bundling, 
 coincides with the dominance level for each product.
Without dominance, firms are symmetric and the marginal consumers are located 
at the center of the interval both under independent pricing and bundling. There are 
thus more marginal consumers under bundling because of the more peakedness. This 
makes demand more elastic, intensifying price competition and lowering the profits 
of both firms. By contrast, when there is very strong dominance, the dominant firm 
has a market share close to one in either competition regime. Then the location of the 
marginal consumers is close to that of the dominated rival. Under bundling, the tail 
of the distribution is thinner and thus there are fewer marginal consumers, implying 
that demand is less elastic. Price competition is softened and the profits of both firms 
increase. For intermediate levels of dominance, there exists an asymmetric demand 
size effect that increases (reduces) the demand of the dominant firm (the dominated 
firm).4 Suppose that the location of the marginal consumers under independent 
3 This is similar to the well-known fact that the average of a random throw of two dice is more (less) likely to 
be between three and four (between five and six) than the random throw of a single dice.
4 This effect also exists for very small and very large dominance levels, but in these cases it is negligible.
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pricing is strictly between the center and the location of the  dominated firm. To fix 
ideas, consider now bundling without changing price  levels such that the average 
location of the marginal consumers under bundling is the same as the location of the 
marginal consumers under independent pricing. Then, because of the more  peak-
edness, bundling increases the demand of the dominant firm while it reduces that 
of the dominated firm. Even if both firms have incentives to change the prices, this 
asymmetric demand size effect determines the signs of profit changes for a range of 
intermediate levels of dominance such that bundling increases (reduces) the profit 
of the dominant firm (the dominated firm).
These results have an implication on the credibility of bundling when entry of 
firm B, the dominated firm, is endogenous. For intermediate levels of dominance, 
pure bundling of firm A is credible and builds an entry barrier. In contrast, for very 
high levels of dominance, bundling does not build a barrier to entry against B (but 
is still profitable for A). In this case, if A could dictate the terms of competition, the 
most effective way to deter entry would be to enforce competition in independent 
pricing, which is opposite to the insight of Whinston (1990).
We find that the welfare effect of bundling is non-monotonic in the  dominance 
level. On the one hand, bundling reduces welfare by increasing mismatch between 
consumer preferences and products. On the other hand, bundling increases  welfare 
if it increases the market share of firm A, because firm A is not aggressive enough 
from a welfare point of view, both under independent pricing and bundling. 
Bundling reduces welfare for low and high levels of dominance because in these 
cases the increase in market share of firm A is either positive but small or negative. 
However, for intermediate levels of dominance, the demand size effect is strong and 
A’s increase in market share may dominate the negative mismatch effect, in which 
case bundling improves welfare. 
In Section IV, we depart from the baseline model by considering asymmetric 
dominance in the sense that firm A is dominant in some market(s) (called, tying 
good market(s)) but not dominant in other market(s) (called, tied good market(s)). 
We identify two conditions under which tying is profitable for firm A but hurts the 
rival: price competition in the tied good market is sufficiently more fierce than in the 
tying good market; the tying firm leverages dominance from multiple markets. These 
results are relevant to the antitrust policy of tying. For instance, in the  wholesale 
cable TV market, channel conglomerates may use bundling to  foreclose compet-
ing channels. In fact, US Senator McCain introduced a bill in 2013 to  encourage 
the wholesale and retail unbundling of programming.5 Cablevision filed a lawsuit 
against Viacom as it considers that Viacom’s obligation to acquire the bundle of core 
and suite networks forecloses Cablevision from distributing  competing networks.
Finally, in Section V, we consider competition between a generalist firm A 
( producing  n different products) and  n specialist firms (each producing exactly 
one of the products). When firm B is replaced by  n specialists, bundling creates 
a Cournot complement problem: for any given price of A’s bundle, the specialists 
choose prices higher than the price that would be chosen if they were integrated. 
5 See Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) for an empirical analysis of retail bundling in cable TV.
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This implies that A’s profit under bundling is strictly higher when the rival firms 
are separate than when they are integrated. This suggests that bundling would have 
been credible for GE and Honeywell if the merger had been approved, as they faced 
specialist rivals.
I. Related Literature
The bundling (or tying) literature can be divided into three categories. The 
papers in the first category study bundling as a price discrimination device for a 
monopolist (Schmalensee 1984; McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston 1989; Salinger 
1995; Armstrong 1996; Bakos and  Brynjolfsson 1999; Fang and  Norman 2006; 
Chen and  Riordan 2013; Menicucci, Hurkens, and  Jeon, 2015; and Daskalakis, 
Deckelbaum, and Tzamos 2017). While the monopoly setting contrasts starkly with 
our duopoly model, it is worthwhile to mention that both Salinger (1995) (with 
uniform  density) and Fang and Norman (2006) (with log-concave density) find the 
demand size effect that plays an important role in our results.
The second category is about competitive bundling where entry and exit is 
not an issue (Matutes and Regibeau 1988; Economides 1989; Carbajo, de Meza, 
and Seidmann 1990; Chen 1997; Denicolò 2000; Nalebuff 2000; Gans and King 
2006; Armstrong and  Vickers 2010; Carlton, Gans, and  Waldman 2010; 
Thanassoulis 2011; Hahn and Kim 2012; Kim and Choi 2015; and Zhou 2017). 
Matutes and Regibeau (1988) shows that bundling intensifies competition in the 
case of  symmetric duopoly. Recently, Kim and  Choi (2015) and Zhou (2017) 
consider symmetric oligopolies and show that the result of Matutes and  Regibeau 
(1988) can be overturned when the number of firms is above some threshold  n ˆ ≥ 3 . 
For both papers, the results are a consequence of a demand elasticity effect, which 
makes the demand under  bundling less elastic, as it occurs in our model for large 
dominance. We  contribute to the theory of competitive bundling by building a gen-
eral framework that includes as a special case the model of Matutes and Regibeau 
(1988) and showing that the level of dominance of a firm is a crucial parameter 
such that their finding is  completely reversed for strong dominance. Hahn and Kim 
(2012) also extends Matutes and Regibeau (1988) by introducing cost asymmetry, 
which generates results  similar to our Proposition 3. However, we consider the gen-
eral class of symmetric and log-concave densities, whereas they consider only the 
uniform distribution, and we provide a unified intuition based on the demand size 
and elasticity effects. Moreover, we identify novel conditions under which leverage 
of dominance into a dominated market is profitable.
The last category is about the leverage theory of bundling in which the main 
motive of bundling is to deter entry in the competitive segment of the market 
(Whinston 1990, Choi and Stefanadis 2001, Carlton and Waldman 2002, Nalebuff 
2004, Peitz 2008, and Jeon and  Menicucci 2006, 2012). The existing theory of 
 leverage considers leverage of monopoly power. For instance, Whinston (1990) 
finds that  pre-commitment to tying builds an entry barrier by inducing the incum-
bent to be aggressive. However, tying is not credible as it also reduces the profit of 
the  incumbent if entry occurs. Therefore, his logic works only for technical tying 
but not for contractual tying, which can be undone cheaply. We contribute to the 
VOL. 11 NO. 3 5HURKENS ET AL.: DOMINANCE AND COMPETITIVE BUNDLING
 leverage theory by studying leverage of dominance (and not of monopoly power) 
and its implications on entry barriers. We identify circumstances under which dom-
inance in tying good market(s) can be credibly leveraged into a tied good market 
domin ated by a rival, which provides a justification for the use of contractual bun-
dling to deter entry.
II. Model
We consider competition between two firms A and B, each producing  n > 1 
 different products. Let  ij denote product  j produced by firm  i , for  i = A, B and 
j = 1, … , n . Each consumer has a unit demand for each product  j .
We consider a model of both vertical and horizontal differentiation. Regarding 
the latter, let  s j ∈ [ 0, 1] denote a generic consumer’s location in terms of  product 
j . For each product, firm A is located at  y A = 0 and firm B is located at  y B = 1 
on a Hotelling segment. The gross utility that a consumer with location  s j obtains 
from consuming product  ij is given by  v i j −  t j | s j −  y i | , where  v i j > 0 is the same 
for all consumers,  t j > 0 is the usual (product-specific) transportation cost 
 parameter, and  | s j −  y i | denotes the distance between the consumer’s and firm  i ’s 
location. Utility is assumed to be additive over different products. We assume 
that  v i j is sufficiently high so that every consumer consumes one of the two com-
peting products in market  j , for any  j = 1, … , n . Hence, the products can be 
interpreted not only as products that can be independently consumed, but also as 
perfect complements.6
For each firm  i and product  j , we assume that the marginal cost is large enough 
that each consumer buys at most one unit of product  j . Without loss of generality, we 
simplify notation by normalizing all marginal costs to zero and interpret  equilibrium 
prices as profit margins. A crucial role is played by the difference in surplus 
 α j =  v Aj −  v Bj . We say that firm A is dominant in market  j when  α j > 0 ; α j   represents the level of A’s dominance in market  j .7
We assume that  s 1 , … ,  s n are i.i.d., each with support  [ 0, 1] , c.d.f.  F and p.d.f. 
f such that  f (s) > 0 for all  s ∈ (0, 1) . Moreover, we assume that  f is different-
iable, symmetric around  1 / 2 , that is  f (s) = f (1 − s) for each  s ∈ [ 0, 1] , and 
 log-concave, that is  log ( f ) is a concave function. This implies that  f is weakly increas-
ing on  [ 0, 1 / 2 ] and weakly decreasing on  [1 / 2, 1] . It also implies that  log(F ) and 
 log(1 − F ) are both concave, so that both  − F / f and  (1 − F )/ f are  decreasing: see 
for example Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005). For technical and expositional reasons, 
we assume further that  f is analytic on  [ 0, 1] .8
Let  p i j be the price charged by firm  i for product  j under independent pricing. 
Under bundling,  P i denotes the price charged by firm  i for the bundle of its  products. 
6 In contrast with independent products, with perfect complements a consumer gets zero gross utility unless 
he buys a unit of all products. Our assumption on  v i j implies that, even with independent products and additive 
utilities, each consumer buys all products. Hence, there is no difference here between independent products and 
perfect complements.
7   α j would capture difference in marginal costs if they were different.
8  f is analytic if it is infinitely differentiable and its Taylor series converges to  f locally uniformly.
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We study the two following games of simultaneous pricing played by firms A 
and B: 
 •  Game of independent pricing [ IP ]: firm A chooses  p Aj and firm B chooses  p Bj 
for all  j = 1, … , n .
 •  Game of pure bundling [ PB ]: firm A chooses  P A for its bundle of  n products and 
firm B chooses  P B for its bundle of  n products.
In Section B2 of the online Appendix, we consider a third game in which  n = 2 , 
α 1 =  α 2 , and firms can use mixed bundling. We show that when firm A has a 
 sufficiently large advantage, the equilibrium outcome of mixed bundling is the same 
as that of pure bundling.9
In Section III, we study our baseline model of  α 1 = ⋯ =  α n > 0 and com-
pare the two games. In addition, by making use of the comparison, we solve for the 
following three-stage game of entry:10
Stage 1: Firm  B chooses between entering by incurring a fixed cost of entry 
K > 0 and not entering.
Stage 2: If  B has entered, each firm chooses between  IP and  PB .
Stage 3: Firms compete in the game determined by their choices at stage two.
According to the timing of the game, firm A cannot commit to bundling or 
 independent pricing before entry can take place. This means, in particular, that 
a deterrence device that relies on commitment is not available under this timing. 
Notice that if in Stage 2 at least one firm has chosen  PB , then competition in Stage 
3 occurs between the two pure bundles.11 Therefore, competition in independent 
prices occurs if and only if both firms have chosen  IP . Also, there always exists an 
equilibrium in which both firms choose  PB at Stage 2, but it may involve playing 
a weakly dominated strategy. We impose that firms do not play weakly dominated 
strategies, therefore  (IP, IP) is the outcome only if this is the preferred outcome for 
both firms.
III. Competition between Generalists: Symmetric Markets
In this section, we consider the baseline model of competition between firm A 
and firm B where all  n markets are symmetric: firm A has a symmetric dominance 
(i.e.,  α =  α 1 = ⋯ =  α n > 0 ) and the transportation cost is symmetric (i.e., 
t =  t 1 = ⋯ =  t n > 0 ). After studying the game of independent pricing and 
9 Relatedly, in a monopoly context Menicucci, Hurkens, and  Jeon (2015) and Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, 
and Tzamos (2017) provide conditions under which pure bundling is the best selling mechanism.
10 Peitz (2008) studies the same game in the context of leveraging monopoly power.
11 Indeed, suppose that firm A, for instance, has chosen  PB and firm B has chosen  IP . Then each consumer either 
buys the pure bundle of A or the  n products of firm B, which are therefore viewed as a bundle.
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that of pure bundling, we compare the two. We consider asymmetric dominance 
levels and transportation costs in Section IV.
A. Independent Pricing
When firms compete in independent prices, we can consider each  market 
in  isolation. Moreover, since markets are symmetric, we suppress the index 
to  product  j and restrict attention to price competition on the Hotelling 
 segment in one market. Given prices  p A and  p B , the indifferent consumer is 
located at
(1)  x (α,  p A ,  p B ) =  1 _2 + σα − σ(  p A −  p B ), 
where
  σ =  1 _ 
2t
. 
For simplicity, we will often suppress the arguments and simply write  x for the 
location of the indifferent consumer.
We suppose for now that the distribution and the parameters are such that 
 independent pricing leads to an interior equilibrium, i.e., both firms obtain a 
positive market share.12 Then the first-order conditions must be satisfied at 
the  equilibrium prices. Since marginal costs are assumed to be zero, the profit 
 functions are
  π A =  p A F( x ),  π B =  p B (1 − F( x )), 
and the first-order conditions are13
  0 = F( x ) − σ p A f ( x ), 0 = 1 − F ( x ) − σ p B  f ( x ). 
If  p A 
⁎ and  p B ⁎ are the equilibrium prices and  x ⁎ denotes the equilibrium location of the 
indifferent consumer, then we have
  x ⁎ = x (α,  p A ⁎ ,  p B ⁎) =  1 _2 + σα − σ ( p A ⁎ −  p B ⁎) =  1 _2 + σα +  
1 − 2F ( x ⁎ )__________ 
f ( x ⁎ ) . 
12 Proposition 1 characterizes when an interior equilibrium exists.
13 Notice that  d π A / d p A = 0 suffices to maximize  π A because  d π A / d p A = F( x )[1 − σ  p A  f ( x )/ F ( x )] , and 
because log-concavity of  F implies that  f ( x ) / F( x ) is decreasing in  x , and thus increasing in  p A . Hence, if  p A ⁎ solves 
the first-order condition, then  d π A / d p A < 0 for  p A >  p A ⁎ and  d π A / d p A > 0 for  p A <  p A ⁎ . A similar argument 
reveals that  d π B / d p B = 0 suffices to maximize  π B with respect to  p B .
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Hence, the equilibrium location of the indifferent consumer is a fixed point of the 
mapping:
(2)  X α : x ↦  1 _
2
+ σα +  1 − 2F( x )_________ 
f ( x ) . 
Notice that  (1 − 2F( x )) / f ( x ) = − (F( x ) / f ( x )) + (1 − F( x )) / f ( x ) . As we 
mentioned in Section II, log-concavity of  f implies that both  −( F( x ) / f ( x )) and 
(1 − F( x )) / f ( x ) are decreasing. Hence,  X α is weakly decreasing. This, jointly 
with  X α (1 / 2) > 1 / 2 , implies that a unique fixed point  x ⁎ < 1  exists provided 
that  lim x ↑ 1  X α ( x ) < 1 . The equilibrium prices are then also unique. Clearly, at α = 0 we have  x ⁎ = 1 / 2 , and Proposition 1(i) establishes that  x ⁎ is increasing 
in  α , hence  x ⁎ > 1 / 2 for  α > 0 . If  α is sufficiently large and  f (1) > 0 , then 
x ⁎ = 1 .
PROPOSITION 1 (Independent Pricing): 
 (i ) Suppose that  (σα − 1 / 2) f (1) < 1 . Then the independent pricing game 
has a unique and interior equilibrium,  characterized by the unique fixed 
point  x ⁎ (α) of  X α , and  x ⁎ (α) ∈ [1 / 2, 1) . The function  x ⁎ (α) is increas-
ing and concave for  α ≥ 0 . The equilibrium prices (in each market) 
are
  p A 
⁎(α) =  F ( x ⁎ (α)) ________σ f ( x ⁎ (α)) ,  p B ⁎(α) =  
1 − F( x ⁎ (α))  ___________σ f ( x ⁎ (α)) . 
 The equilibrium profits (in each market) are
  π A ⁎(α) =  F  ( x 
⁎ (α)) 2 
 _________σ f ( x ⁎ (α)) ,  π B ⁎(α) =  
 (1 − F ( x ⁎ (α))) 2 
  ______________ σ f ( x ⁎ (α)) ; 
  p A 
⁎ and  π A ⁎ are increasing in  α , while  p B ⁎ and  π B ⁎ are decreasing in  α .
 (ii ) Suppose that  (σα − 1 / 2) f (1) ≥ 1 . Then the independent pricing game has 
a unique equilibrium, and it is such that firm  A ’s market share is 1. The 
 equilibrium prices and profits (in each market) are
  p A 
⁎(α) =  π A ⁎(α) = α − 1 / (2σ),   p B ⁎(α) =  π B ⁎(α) = 0. 
Note that for any prices  p A and  p B , the demand for firm A is given by 
 D A (  p A ,  p B ) = F( x(α,  p A ,  p B )) . So, the elasticity of  D A with respect to  p A equals
(3)  ε A (  p A ,  p B ) =  σf ( x )  p A  _______F( x ) . 
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Similarly, the demand for firm  B is  1 − F(x (α,  p A ,  p B )) , and its elasticity with 
respect to  p B equals
(4)  ε B (  p A ,  p B ) =  σ f ( x )  p B  _______1 − F( x ) . 
In particular, at the equilibrium prices  p A 
⁎ and  p B ⁎ , the elasticity of 
demand with respect to one firm’s own price is equal to one for each firm: 
 ε A (  p A ⁎ ,  p B ⁎ ) = 1 =  ε B (  p A ⁎ ,  p B ⁎ ) . This resembles the well-known inverse 
 elasticity rule for a monopolist with zero marginal cost. This is so because, 
for a given  price  of  the rival, each firm acts as a monopolist with respect to its 
own demand. Hence, each firm’s reaction function is determined by this inverse 
elasticity rule.
B. Pure Bundling
The analysis performed for independent pricing straightforwardly extends to 
 bundling since competition under bundling can be considered as a competition 
between two firms, each offering one product—in fact, a bundle. The only differ-
ence is that we should use the density  f n of the average location  ( s 1 + ⋯ +  s n ) / n , 
and not the density  f of the individual location. Note that the density function of 
a sum of  n i.i.d. random variables with p.d.f.  f is obtained by the  n -fold convo-
lution of  f . The density function of the average,  f n , is then obtained by rescaling. 
It follows that  f n has two properties that are relevant for our analysis of pure 
 bundling. First,  f n is log-concave and symmetric because  f is (see An 1998, Cor. 1). 
Second,  f n (1) = 0 .
Given  P A and  P B chosen by the firms, let  p A =  P A / n and  p B =  P  B / n denote the 
prices per product. Let  x n denote the average location of the indifferent consumer, 
which is again given by
  x n = x(α,  p A ,  p B ) =  1 _2 + σα − σ(  p A −  p B ). 
The equilibrium bundle prices are found in a way very similar to the analysis of 
independent pricing. Let us thus define
(5)  X n α : x ↦  1 _2 + σα +  
1 − 2 F n( x )_________ 
 f n ( x ) . 
Since  f n is log-concave, we obtain (as above) that  X n α is decreasing in  x . 
Since  f n (1) = 0 ,  X n α always admits a unique fixed point  x n ⁎(α) < 1 , and equilib-
rium prices and profits can be expressed in terms of this fixed point. Hence, under 
pure bundling we always obtain a unique and interior equilibrium in which both 
firms have a positive market share.
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PROPOSITION 2 (Pure Bundling): The pure bundling pricing game has a 
unique equilibrium, characterized by the unique fixed point  x n 
⁎(α) of  X n α , and 
 x n 
⁎(α) ∈ [1 / 2, 1) . The function  x n ⁎(α) is increasing and concave for  α ≥ 0 . The 
equilibrium bundle prices are
  P n, A 
⁎ (α) =  n F n( x n ⁎(α)) _________σ f n ( x n ⁎(α)) ,  P n, B 
⁎ (α) =  n(1 −  F n( x n ⁎(α)))  ______________ σ  f n ( x n ⁎(α)) . 
The total equilibrium profits are
  Π n, A ⁎ (α) =  n F n ( x n 
⁎(α)) 2 
 __________σ f n ( x n ⁎(α)) ,  Π n, B 
⁎ (α) =  n (1 −  F n( x n ⁎(α))) 2   ______________ σ f n ( x n ⁎(α)) ; 
 P n, A 
⁎ and  Π n, A ⁎ are increasing in  α , while  P n, B ⁎ and  Π n, B ⁎ are decreasing in  α .
Note that the elasticity of demand for A’s bundle (with respect to own price per 
product) is given by
(6)  ε ̃A (  p A ,  p B ) =  σ f n ( x )  p A  ________ F n( x ) . 
As under independent pricing, at the equilibrium bundle prices the elasticity of 
demand with respect to a firm’s own price is equal to one.
C. Independent Pricing versus Pure Bundling
In this section, we study how bundling affects each firm’s profit in  comparison 
with independent pricing. We first do this for the special case where each firm 
produces just two products and where consumers’ locations for each product 
are uniformly distributed. This case allows explicit expressions and is  therefore 
straightforward. It shows that both firms lose (gain) from bundling for low 
(high) levels of dominance, and that only the dominant firm benefits from  bundling 
for intermediate levels. We then show that this result extends to any number of 
products and any symmetric log-concave density function. Since the proof for the 
general case is quite  technical, we leave that to the Appendix and here  provide only 
the intuition, based on the demand size and demand elasticity effects of  bundling. 
We will explain these effects using a few important properties of the distribution 
of the average location.
Uniform Distribution and Two Products.—In the special case of the uniform 
 distribution, we have  f (x) = 1 ,  F( x ) = x , and, for  x ≥ 1 / 2 ,  f 2 ( x ) = 4(1 − x ) , 
F 2 ( x ) = 1 − 2  (1 − x ) 2 . These functions are depicted in Figure  1. Fixing 
t = 1 (or  σ = 1 / 2 ), we can get explicit expressions for equilibrium prices 
and profits under  independent pricing and bundling when  n = 2 by substituting 
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x ⁎ = (3 + α) / 6 and  x 2 ⁎ = (7 + α −  √ _  9 − 2α +  α 2 )/8 into the expressions of 
Propositions 1 and 2.14
It is easily verified (numerically) that firm A benefits from bundling if and only 
if  α > 1.415 and that firm B benefits from bundling if and only if  α > 2.376 . 
Defining dominance regions
   − − = [0, 1.415),   + − = (1.415, 2.376),   + + = (2.376, ∞), 
we see that both firms lose from bundling when  α ∈   − − , firm A gains while 
firm B loses from bundling when  α ∈   + − , and both firms gain from bundling 
when  α ∈   + + .
The General Case.—We now consider the general case with  n products 
and any symmetric log-concave  f . We will establish the existence of three 
 dominance  level  regions   − − ,   + − , and   + + with the respective effects 
on the profits of firms A and B under bundling. Unfortunately, direct  comparison 
of the profits is hard because not only are the relevant distribution functions 
(  f and  f n )  different under independent pricing and bundling, but so are the 
 equilibrium locations of the indifferent consumers ( x ⁎ (α) and  x n ⁎(α) ). One 
 exception is the symmetric case without dominance (i.e., when  α = 0 ) 
because then clearly  x ⁎ = 1 / 2 =  x n ⁎ and  F(1 / 2) = 1 / 2 =  F n (1 / 2) . 
Direct  comparison of the expressions for profits in Propositions 1 and 2 
shows that both firms lose from bundling if and only if  f n (1 / 2) > f (1 / 2) . 
We show this to be true in Lemma  1 below. Hence, this already generalizes 
the findings of Matutes and Regibeau (1988) that bundling lowers  profits in a 
symmetric duopoly.
14 The condition  (σα − 1 / 2) f  (1) ≥ 1 in Proposition 1(ii)  is equivalent to  α ≥ 3 , hence  x ⁎ = ( 3 + α ) / 6 
if  α < 3 ,  x ⁎ = 1 if  α ≥ 3 .
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Figure 1. Density and Distribution Functions for the Uniform Case
Note: The thicker (blue) graphs correspond to average valuations (bundling).
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In order to establish our results in the case of dominance, we need some further 
important properties of the density  f n of the average location. First,  f n is strictly more 
peaked around 1/2 (the mean) than the density  f of the individual location (Proschan 
1965).15, 16 That is, for any  z ∈ ( 0, 1 / 2) ,
  ∫ 
z
1−z
 f (s) ds <  ∫ 
z
1−z
  f n (s) ds. 
The more peakedness of  f n can be equivalently expressed as  F n ( x ) > F( x ) 
for all  x ∈ (1 / 2, 1) . In fact, we have  F k ( x ) >  F k−1 ( x ) for all  x ∈ (1 / 2, 1) , 
for  k = 2, … , n . Second, Lemma  1 states two useful properties of the ratio 
between the density function of the average and that of the individual locations.17
LEMMA 1: Let  f be a log-concave density function that is symmetric around  1 / 2 
with support  [ 0, 1] . Let  f n be the density function of the average of  n > 1 random 
variables that are i.i.d. according to the density function  f . Then we have
 (i)  f n (1 / 2) > f (1 / 2) ;
 (ii)  lim s ↑ 1  f n (s) / f (s) = 0 .
In sum, the distribution of the average is less dispersed than the distribution of the 
original random variable. There is relatively strictly more weight at the mean and 
much less weight at the extremes. Figure 1 illustrates the more peakedness and the 
properties of Lemma 1 for the case of the uniform distribution with  n = 2 .
Using these general properties, we now proceed to explain how bundling causes 
demand size and demand elasticity effects. Jointly, they determine how firms’ prof-
its are affected by bundling. Rather than comparing the equilibrium profits under 
independent pricing and bundling directly, we use a two-step procedure by consid-
ering an intermediate step where firms sell the products in a bundle but charge prices 
corresponding to the equilibrium under independent pricing.
Demand Size Effect.—Suppose that initially firms A and B sell their  products 
 independently and set the equilibrium prices  p A 
⁎ and  p B ⁎ for each product. At 
these prices, firm A has demand  F( x ⁎ ) . Suppose now that each firm bundles its  n 
 products, without changing the price per product:  P A = n p A ⁎ and  P  B = n p B ⁎ . Then 
the  indifferent consumers are those whose average location is equal to  x ⁎ . The 
demand for A’s bundle is thus equal to  F n ( x ⁎ ) , and the demand for B’s bundle is 
 1 −  F n ( x ⁎ ) . Since  F n is more peaked around the mean,  F n ( x ⁎ ) > F( x ⁎ ) whenever 
1 / 2 <  x ⁎ < 1 . Hence, bundling—without changing prices per product—leads to 
15 In fact, for all  t 1 , … ,  t n > 0 , the weighted average  ( ∑ j=1 n  t j  s j ) / ∑ j=1 n  t j is distributed with a log-concave 
density function that is more peaked around the mean than that of the original variable.
16 Observe that for density functions that are not log-concave, the average is not necessarily more peaked than 
the original distribution (see for instance the Cauchy distribution). This explains our restriction to log-concave 
densities.
17 We develop Lemma 1 because the result does not follow generally from Proschan (1965). We use here the 
fact that the support of the distributions is assumed compact. For example, property (i) of Lemma 1 does not hold 
for the Laplace distribution defined on the real line.
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a higher demand for the dominant firm. We call the difference  F  n ( x ⁎ ) − F( x ⁎ ) the 
demand size effect of bundling. Note that this difference is tiny when  x ⁎ ≈ 1 / 2 
or  x ⁎ ≈ 1 , and that it is maximal at  x ⁎ =  x ˆ, where  x ˆ ∈ (1 / 2, 1) is defined by 
  f ( x ˆ) =  f n ( x ˆ) .18
Demand Elasticity Effect.—After bundling, the firms will have incentives to 
change their prices. From Sections IIIA and IIIB, we know that each firm chooses its 
price optimally by making the elasticity of own demand equal to one. In  particular, 
this is why  p A 
⁎ = F( x ⁎ ) / (σf ( x ⁎ )) . After bundling, but before changing prices, the 
elasticity of demand for A’s bundle is given by (6) and therefore equal to
  ε ̃A = σ    f n ( x 
⁎ ) _____
 F   n ( x ⁎ )  p A 
⁎ =    f n ( x ⁎ ) _____
f ( x ⁎ )  
F( x ⁎ ) _____
 F  n ( x ⁎ ) ,
and this will in general not equal one. This change in the elasticity of demand after 
bundling is what we call the demand elasticity effect. Clearly, for  x ⁎ >  x ˆ, we have 
 f n ( x ⁎ ) < f ( x ⁎ ) and then from  F n ( x ⁎ ) ≥ F( x ⁎ ) , we obtain  ε ̃A < 1 . In this case, 
 bundling makes demand less elastic and the dominant firm wants to raise its 
price. In particular, for large dominance,  x ⁎ is close to 1 and the demand elasticity 
effect is very large because of Lemma 1(ii). On the contrary, for low dominance, 
x ⁎ ≈ 1 / 2 ,  F( x ⁎ ) ≈  F n ( x ⁎ ) but then  f 2 ( x ⁎ ) > f ( x ⁎ ) by Lemma 1(i). Therefore, 
we have  ε ̃A > 1 . In this case, bundling makes demand more elastic and the  dominant 
firm wants to lower its price.
For very low levels of dominance such that  x ⁎ ≈ 1 / 2 , both firms are similar and 
hence bundling makes demand more elastic for both firms. Therefore, both firms 
want to lower their price after bundling and thus lose from bundling. This result also 
follows directly from the fact that profits are continuous in the dominance level and 
that both firms lose from bundling when there is no dominance, as we established 
before.
For a range of intermediate levels of dominance, bundling affects the profits of 
the two firms in different ways because of the demand size effect. Even if both firms 
have incentives to change their price after bundling, this effect is dominated by the 
demand size effect when the latter is relatively large, which implies that bundling 
then increases the profit of the dominant firm and reduces the profit of the dominated 
firm.
Finally, for very high levels of dominance, the dominant firm’s demand becomes 
very inelastic after bundling, giving incentives to raise its price substantially. 
This  shifts the location of the indifferent consumer away from the dominated 
firm,  raising the demand of firm B. Since for high dominance levels the demand 
size effect is negligible, the overall effect is that firm B benefits from bundling. 
We can make this statement easily precise if we suppose that  f (1) > 0 .19 Then 
Proposition 1(ii) reveals that under independent pricing,  B   has 0 market share, 
0 profit, and sets  p B 
⁎ = 0. Bundling cannot reduce the profit of firm A because by 
18 The existence of such  x ˆ is guaranteed by Lemma 1. For the sake of exposition, we assume here it is unique.
19 Our formal proof does allow for  f (1) = 0 . It does not change our conclusions but complicates the argument.
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charging  P A = n p A ⁎ , it still sells all products to all consumers (since necessarily 
P  B ≥ 0 ) and earns the same profit as under independent pricing. But in fact, firm 
A can do even better by raising its price a bit as its demand is very inelastic. Recall 
that the profit of firm  A  is  P A  F  n ( x ) , and a marginal increase of its price,  Δ  P A , raises 
profits by  Δ  P A ( F  n ( x ) − σ( P A /n)  f n (x)) , which is strictly positive  at  x = 1  because 
f n (1) = 0 .20 Moreover,  P A > n p A ⁎   benefits firm  B   as it allows  B   to charge a 
strictly positive price  P  B  and nevertheless have a positive market share, yielding 
a strictly positive profit. Hence, bundling makes both firms better off when  α  is 
large. Lemma 2 below shows more generally that both firms prefer bundling when 
bundling increases firm  B ’s market share, and that there exist dominance levels for 
which only firm A benefits from bundling.
LEMMA 2: We have the following implications for each dominance level  α :
 (i ) If  α is such that bundling strictly raises firm  B ’s market share, then bundling 
raises firm  B ’s profit.
 (ii ) If  α is such that bundling raises firm  B ’s profit, then bundling raises firm  A ’s 
profit.
 (iii ) Neither the reverse of (i ) nor the reverse of (ii ) holds.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 2 is that there are three regions of 
 dominance levels,    − − ,   + − , and   + + , with distinct effects of bundling on 
the firms’ profits. For one set of dominance levels,   − − (including  α = 0 ), both 
firms are hurt by bundling; for another set,   + − , bundling hurts only firm  B ; for 
a final set,   + + (including high values of  α ), both firms benefit from bundling. 
It never happens that bundling hurts the dominant firm while benefiting the rival. 
We conjecture that these dominance sets are convex sets (i.e., intervals), but have 
been unable to prove it for general log-concave symmetric density functions and 
number of products.21 We therefore summarize our central result as follows.
PROPOSITION 3 (Independent Pricing versus Bundling): 
 (i ) There exist threshold levels  0 <  α ¯ ≤  α π A <  α π B ≤  α – such that bundling strictly benefits firm A and hurts firm B when  α ∈ ( α π A ,  α π B ) , strictly hurts 
both firms when  α ∈ [ 0,  α ¯) , and strictly benefits both firms when  α >  α – .
 (ii ) If the dominance level sets   − − ,   + − , and   + + are convex, then 
 α ¯ =  α π A and  α π B =  α – so that (a) profits of firm A are strictly higher under 
20 We find at work here the same principle that makes it optimal not to sell to all consumers for a 
 multi-product monopolist; see Armstrong (1996).
21 We can numerically show this to be true for the uniform distribution and  2 ≤ n ≤ 32, and for symmetric 
beta-distributions  f (s) =  (s (1 − s)) β for integers  1 ≤ β ≤ 10 and  n = 2 .
VOL. 11 NO. 3 15HURKENS ET AL.: DOMINANCE AND COMPETITIVE BUNDLING
bundling if and only if  α >  α π A , and (b) profits of firm B are strictly higher 
under bundling if and only if  α >  α π B .
For the case of uniform distributions, we can numerically determine the  different 
dominance level sets for different numbers of products. Let  α ¯ n (respectively,  α –  n ) denote the cutoff value for which firm A (respectively B) is indifferent 
between independent pricing and pure bundling when there are  n  products. 
Then  α ¯ 2 = 1.41 ,  α ¯ 3 = 1.42,  α ¯ 4 = 1.39 ,  α ¯ 8 = 1.29 , and  α ¯16 = 1.19 , and  α – 2 = 2.38 ,  α – 3 = 2.54 ,  α – 4 = 2.64 ,  α –  8 = 2.77 , and  α – 16 = 2.85 . Bundling 
more and more products makes wider the dominance region   + − , where only 
firm A benefits from bundling, which plays a role for the result described in 
Proposition 6.22
Our results can be extended to the case of positive correlation in tastes. 
Suppose that a fraction  ρ ∈ ( 0, 1] of consumers have perfectly correlated loca-
tions, while the rest have locations which are i.i.d. as above. Given  ( ρ, ρ′ ) satisfying 
1 ≥ ρ > ρ′ > 0 , the distribution of the average location for  ρ is less peaked than 
that of the average location for  ρ′ . Therefore, a greater positive correlation weakens 
both the demand size effect and the demand elasticity effect.23
D. Entry Deterrence
We are now in a position to solve the three-stage game outlined in Section  II 
by backward induction. In the last stage, firms choose the equilibrium prices 
 corresponding to the bundling game whenever at least one firm has chosen PB. 
This is so because if, for example, firm A chooses PB and firm B chooses IP, then 
effectively competition will be in bundles, and equilibrium prices will be  P n, A 
⁎ for 
A’s bundle, and  P n, B 
⁎ / n for each of B’s individual products. Substituting equilibrium 
payoffs from Stage 3 yields the following game to be played in Stage 2, where  K 
denotes the fixed cost of entry of firm B.
PB IP
PB  Π n, A ⁎ ,  Π n, B ⁎ − K  Π n, A ⁎ ,  Π n, B ⁎ − K 
IP  Π n, A ⁎ ,  Π n, B ⁎ − K  n π A ⁎ , n π B ⁎ − K 
Of course, in this reduced-form game, both firms have a weakly  dominant 
 strategy. It is a weakly dominant strategy for firm A to choose  PB when 
 α ∈   + − ∪    + + and to choose IP otherwise. Similarly, it is a weakly 
 dominant strategy for firm B to choose  PB when  α ∈   + + and to choose IP 
otherwise.
22 However, note that  α ¯ n is not monotonic at  n = 3 as we have  α ¯ 3 >  α ¯ 2 >  α ¯ 4 .23 In the case of the uniform distribution with  n = 2 , we find that the two threshold values of  α 2 decrease with ρ ∈ (0, 1) . However,  α ¯ 2 decreases more slowly than  α – 2 .
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The bundling outcome will prevail whenever firm  A benefits from bundling and 
it will then be enforced by firm A. For very low levels of dominance, firm A may 
be tempted to threaten to use bundling in order to deter entry, as this would lower 
firm B’s profit. However, such a threat is not credible because firm A would choose 
independent pricing once B has entered. For (very high) levels of dominance for 
which bundling is profitable for firm B, firm A cannot use bundling to deter entry. In 
fact, in order to deter entry, firm A would need to threaten to use  IP . Not only is this 
not credible, but firm B can in fact force bundling by choosing  PB unilaterally. Only 
for intermediate levels of dominance bundling is profitable for A (and thus credible) 
and hurts firm B. Hence, bundling can then be used as a foreclosure strategy if it 
reduces B’s profit below B’s entry cost.24
E. Social Welfare
In this subsection, we study and compare static social welfare (defined as 
the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus) under independent pricing and 
 bundling. We focus on the case of  f (1) > 0 . We find that the effects of bundling are 
 non-monotonic in the dominance level. Recall from Propositions 1 and 2 that the 
market share is always interior under bundling while, under independent pricing, 
firm A’s share becomes one when  (σα − 1 / 2) f (1) ≥ 1 . We have the following 
result.
PROPOSITION 4 (Welfare):
 (i ) Both under independent pricing and under bundling, the market share of 
firm  A is too low from the point of view of social welfare for any  α > 0 as 
long as it is interior.
 (ii ) Suppose that  f (1) > 0 . Then bundling reduces social welfare both for 
 α (≥  0) small enough and for  α (≥  0) large enough (in particular, 
when  (σα − 1 / 2) f (1) ≥ 1 ). For intermediate values of  α , bundling may 
increase or reduce social welfare. When  F is the uniform distribution and 
n = 2 , bundling increases social welfare if  α is between 1.071t and 2.306t 
and reduces social welfare otherwise.
The dominance of firm  A over firm  B implies that the socially optimal loca-
tion of the indifferent consumer is greater than  1 / 2 , but it turns out that in equi-
librium firm  A is often not aggressive enough, and the location of the indifferent 
consumer is closer to  1 / 2 than the socially optimal location. There is an exception 
for the case of competition under IP when  (σα − 1 / 2) f (1) ≥ 1 , because then it 
is socially optimal that each consumer buys from firm  A , and  x ⁎ (α) = 1 holds 
24 In Section B2 of the online Appendix, we consider  n = 2 and show that when firm A has a sufficiently 
large advantage, the equilibrium outcome of mixed bundling is the same as that of pure bundling. Hence, if we 
replace Stages 2 and 3 with a single stage in which both firms can choose any tariff in mixed bundling, the outcome 
of the sequential game remains unchanged as long as A’s dominance is large enough. In the case of the uniform 
 distribution, mixed bundling leads to the pure bundling outcome for  α ≥ 9t / 8 .
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because of Proposition 1(ii). This implies that IP  generates a higher social wel-
fare than PB when  α is large, since IP  induces the socially optimal outcome that 
all consumers buy from firm  A . Conversely, when  α is close to zero the firms are 
almost symmetric, thus they have about the same market share and the difference in 
social welfare between IP and PB is mainly determined by transportation costs. The 
latter are smaller under IP  than under PB  because PB  prevents consumers from 
freely selecting their preferred combinations of products (that is, they cannot mix 
and match). Hence, PB generates a lower social welfare.
However, when  α takes on intermediate values, PB may significantly increase 
the market share of firm  A with respect to IP. This brings the economy closer to the 
socially optimal allocation, and this effect may outweigh the effect of transportation 
costs, such that PB increases social welfare. For the uniform distribution, part (ii) of 
the proposition identifies the set of values of  α for which this occurs.
Our welfare comparison above has been static in the sense that we have consid-
ered a given duopolistic market structure. However, we know from Subsection IIID 
that bundling may help firm  A to erect an entry barrier against firm  B . For instance, 
for the uniform distribution and  n = 2 , bundling is credible and reduces B’s 
profit for  α ∈ (1.415t, 2.376t ) , which largely overlaps with the interval for which 
 bundling increases static welfare. Therefore, one should be very cautious in gener-
ating policy implications on bundling from static welfare analysis.
IV. Credible Leverage of Dominance
In the previous section, we considered only one type of asymmetry, captured 
by the dominance level  α of firm A, and assumed that all markets were the same. 
In order to relate our results to the leverage theory, we now consider asymmetric 
markets. In particular, we assume that A is dominant in some market (called, tying 
product market) but faces an equally strong competitor in some other market(s) 
(called, tied product market).25 We investigate whether bundling can be profitable, 
that is, whether leverage is feasible.
With symmetric markets, the effect on profits of bundling could be decomposed 
into a demand size and a demand elasticity effect. However, the demand size effect 
does not straightforwardly extend to asymmetric markets because bundling at equal 
total price reduces demand for the tying product and increases demand for the tied 
product. When total demand (in terms of total units sold) stays the same, bundling 
reduces profits when the profit margin in the tying product is higher than in the tied 
product, which is typically the case. In particular, for the profit of firm A to increase 
it is necessary (but not sufficient) that firm A enjoys a positive “ total” demand size 
effect.
It is not obvious that a firm that is dominant in one market can profitably leverage 
this dominance to a second market by bundling the two products. In fact, in the case 
of uniform distributions of consumers’ locations and equal transportation cost, we 
25 By continuity, our results can be extended to situations where A is slightly dominated in the tied product 
market.
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can show that bundling is not credible as it reduces A’s profit for any  α 1 ∈ [ 0, 3t ] 
and  α 2 = 0 .
Nevertheless, we identify two circumstances in which A can leverage dominance 
and increase overall profits. First, we show that (for some parameters) leverage 
of dominance is possible and profitable when the firm is sufficiently dominant in 
a market where price competition is relatively weak compared to that of the tied 
 product market. Second, we show that if the firms compete in  n ≥ 3 markets and 
one firm is dominant in sufficiently many of those, then bundling is again profitable. 
These results are relevant to the antitrust policy of tying as antitrust authorities are 
often concerned about situations in which the tied product is inferior to or as good 
as the competing product.
A. Asymmetric Intensity of Competition
In this subsection, we assume that firm  A is dominant in market  1 but not in 
market  2 (i.e.,  α 1 > 0 =  α 2 ), but price competition is more intense in market 2 
than in market 1. We capture this difference in competition intensity in two com-
plementary ways. First, we assume that, while in market 1 the location of consum-
ers is uniformly distributed, in market 2 it is distributed according to a symmetric 
(and log-concave) beta distribution such that  f  β ( x ) =  x β−1  (1 − x ) β−1 / B( β, β ) , 
where  B( β, β ) =  ∫ 0 1  s β−1  (1 − s) β−1 ds and  β ≥ 1 . Notice that  f  1 coincides with 
the  uniform density, but for  β > 1 we have  f  β (1 / 2) >  f   1 (1 / 2) , therefore con-
sumers’ locations under  f  β are more concentrated around  1 / 2 than under  f  1 ;  this 
makes  market 2 more competitive than market 1, given the symmetry between the 
firms in this market. Additionally, we assume that the transportation cost parameter 
in  market 2 is smaller than in market 1,  0 <  t 2 ≤  t 1 = 1 .
We need to extend the analysis of price competition for the bundle in this asym-
metric case. Note that a consumer with location  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) is indifferent between both 
bundles when
  α 1 −  P A −  t 1  x 1 −  t 2  x 2 = − P  B −  t 1 (1 −  x 1 ) −  t 2 (1 −  x 2 ). 
Let  x = ( t 1  x 1 +  t 2  x 2 ) / ( t 1 +  t 2 ) denote the weighted average location of a con-
sumer. In equilibrium, the weighted average location of the indifferent consumer is 
implicitly given by
  x =  1 _
2
+   α 1  _______ 
2 ( t 1 +  t 2 ) +  
1 − 2 F ̃( x )_________ 
 f ̃ ( x ) ,
where  F ̃ is now the distribution function of the weighted average of  x 1 and  x 2 . In 
particular,  F ̃ depends on  t 1 and  t 2 .
Our next proposition describes our numerical results about leverage in this setting.
PROPOSITION 5: Consider competition between two firms each producing 
two products. Suppose that  s 1 is uniformly distributed over  [ 0, 1] , while  s 2 is dis-
tributed according to the  β -distribution  f  β with  β ≥ 1 . Let  t 1 = 1 ≥  t 2 and 
 α 1 > 0 =  α 2 . Firm A can profitably leverage its dominance from market 1 by 
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 bundling the products when the dominance is strong enough and market 2 is 
 sufficiently more competitive. Table 1 reports for different values of  β and  t 2  cutoff 
values for  α 1 above which bundling is profitable for firm A. Bundling always 
reduces the profit of firm B.
Note from Table 1 that whether bundling is profitable for a given level of 
 dominance  α 1 is non-monotonic in  β and in  t 2 .
To illustrate the proposition, let us discuss the case of  β = 5 and  t 2 = 1 , in 
which case  α ˆ 1 = 2.932 . Figure 2 shows the density functions of consumers’ 
 locations in each market and for the average (bundle). Competition in market 2 
is more intense because  f  5 is more peaked than the uniform distribution: without 
dominance,  symmetric equilibrium prices are equal to 1 in market 1 and  0.406 
in market  2. Note  that the density function corresponding to the bundle is more 
Table 1—Asymmetric Competition Intensity: Cutoff Values  α ˆ 1 above Which Bundling Is Profitable 
for Firm A
β↓\t2→ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
1 2.883 2.833 2.849 2.937 dne dne dne dne
2 2.875 2.810 2.786 2.797 2.843 2.924 dne dne
3 2.880 2.814 2.780 2.772 2.787 2.824 2.884 2.967
4 2.886 2.821 2.783 2.766 2.768 2.786 2.821 2.872
5 2.892 2.828 2.788 2.767 2.761 2.769 2.790 2.824
6 2.895 2.834 2.794 2.770 2.759 2.761 2.773 2.797
7 2.901 2.840 2.799 2.773 2.760 2.757 2.764 2.780
8 2.904 2.845 2.805 2.777 2.761 2.755 2.758 2.769
9 2.908 2.850 2.809 2.782 2.764 2.755 2.755 2.762
Note: The label “dne” indicates that such cutoff does not exist.
Source: Authors’ calculations








Note: Density functions for market 1 (blue), market 2 (red), and (half) the bundle (green).
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peaked than the uniform distribution, but not so with respect to  f  5 . When firm A has 
 dominance level  α 1 = 3 , under independent pricing,  p A1 ⁎ = 2 and  p B1 ⁎ = 0 hold 
and firm A has 100 percent market share in market 1. Firm 1 has 50 percent market 
share in market 2 as we assume  α 2 = 0 . So firm A produces 75 percent of all units. 
Firm A’s profit equals  2.203 and firm B’s profit equals  0.203 .
When firms A and B bundle without changing total prices, A’s market share goes 
up to 94 percent, indicating that the demand size effect is large. Firm A’s profit 
then also goes up, to about 2.26, because he loses only a small fraction of sales in 
market 1 (where the profit margin is high), whereas he gains a lot of market share 
in market 2. In the equilibrium under bundling, firm B reduces the total price (from 
0.406 to 0.325) while firm A increases it (from 2.406 to 2.501), only partially undo-
ing the demand size effect (from 94 percent to 88.5 percent).
B. Leverage of Multiple Products
We now assume that A and B compete in  n ≥ 3 different markets, and that A 
is dominant in  k markets, with  1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1:  α 1 = ⋯ =  α k ≡ α >  α k+1 = ⋯ =  α n = 0 . We consider symmetric transportation cost  t 1 = ⋯ = 
t n = 1 and uniformly distributed consumer locations in all markets. Then bundling 
is  profitable for firm A when it is dominant enough in sufficiently many markets.
PROPOSITION 6: Consider competition between two firms each producing  n ≥ 3 
products. Suppose that  s j is independently and uniformly distributed over  [ 0, 1] for 
j = 1, … , n . Assume  t 1 = ⋯ =  t n = 1 and  α 1 = ⋯ =  α k ≡ α ∈ ( 0, 3] 
and  α k+1 = ⋯ =  α n = 0 . Then bundling always reduces firm B’s profit but in 
some cases it increases firm  A ’s profit if  α is sufficiently close to 3. Table 2 reports 
for some pairs  ( n, k ) the cutoff value  α ˆ 1 ∈ ( 0, 3] such that bundling increases the 
profit of firm A if  α ∈ ( α ˆ 1 , 3] .
V. Competing against Specialists
Up to now, we have considered competition between two generalists. In this 
 section, we consider competition between a generalist firm A and specialists 
 B1 , … ,  Bn where  Bj (  j = 1, 2, … , n ) denotes the firm specialized in  product  j . 
For instance, in the case of GE-Honeywell merger, the merged firm would  compete 
against engine specialists and avionics specialists. In the absence of  bundling, 
 competition in market  j between A and  Bj occurs as we have described in Section IIIA.26
Under pure bundling of A’s products, it is as if the specialists offer a bundle of 
their products at the price  ∑ j=1 n  p Bj and consumers choose between A’s bundle and 
the bundle of the specialists. As each specialist chooses its price non-cooperatively, 
bundling creates a Cournot complement problem: for any given price of A’s bundle, 
the specialists choose prices too high relative to the price that would be chosen by a 
26 DenicolÒ (2000) considers competition between a generalist and two specialists when two firms in 
each  product market are symmetric and characterizes how bundling affects profits when the two products are 
 asymmetrically differentiated.
VOL. 11 NO. 3 21HURKENS ET AL.: DOMINANCE AND COMPETITIVE BUNDLING
generalist firm B, because each specialist does not internalize the negative externality 
on the demand for the other specialists when it raises its price. This implies that 
A ’s profit under bundling is strictly higher when the rival firms are separate than 
when they are integrated. However, it is not clear whether the rivals’ profits under 
bundling will be lower than when they are integrated. On the one hand, they set too 
high prices due to the Cournot complement problem, but on the other hand, this in 
turn induces A to charge a higher price because prices are strategic complements.
Firm A produces all products and sells them in a bundle at total price  n p A . 
Firms B1, … , B n produce one good each, sold at prices  p B1 , … ,  p Bn . The  indifferent 
consumer has average location  y n where
(7)  y n =  1 _2 + σ (α −  p A +  1 _n  ∑ j=1
n
  p Bj ) , 
with  σ = 1 / (2t ) . We denote with  y n ⁎⁎ the equilibrium average location of the 
 indifferent consumer, and we can argue as in Subsection IIIA to conclude that  y n 
⁎⁎ is 
the unique fixed point of the mapping
(8)  Y n α : y ↦  1 _2 + σα +  
n − (n + 1)  F  n ( y)  _______________
 f n ( y) 
and  y n 
⁎⁎ determines the equilibrium prices and profits as described by the next 
proposition.
PROPOSITION 7 (Specialists): The pure bundling pricing game against spe-
cialists has a unique equilibrium, characterized by the unique fixed point  y n 
⁎⁎ (α) 
of  Y n 
α , and  y n ⁎⁎ (α) ∈ (1 / 2, 1) . The function  y n ⁎⁎ (α) is increasing and concave for α ≥ 0 . The equilibrium prices per product are
  p n, A 
⁎⁎ (α) =   F  n ( y n ⁎⁎ (α)) _________σ  f n (  y n ⁎⁎ (α)) ,   p n, Bj 
⁎⁎ (α) =  n(1 −  F  n (  y n ⁎⁎ (α))) _______________ σ f n (  y n ⁎⁎ (α)) for j = 1, … , n. 
The equilibrium profits are
  Π n, A ⁎⁎ (α) =  n F  n  (  y n 
⁎⁎ (α)) 2 
  ___________σ  f n (  y n ⁎⁎ (α)) ,  Π n, Bj 
⁎⁎ (α) =  n  (1 −  F  n ( y n ⁎⁎ (α))) 2   ________________ σ  f n (  y n ⁎⁎ (α)) for j = 1, … , n; 
Table 2—Multiple Products: Cutoff Values  α ˆ 1 above Which Bundling Is Profitable for Firm A 
When Dominant in k out of n Markets
n↓\k→ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 dne 2.496 – – – – – –
4 dne dne 2.023 – – – – –
5 dne dne 2.705 1.794 – – – –
6 dne dne dne 2.235 1.662 – – –
7 dne dne dne 2.736 1.986 1.573 – –
8 dne dne dne dne 2.337 1.828 1.508 –
9 dne dne dne dne 2.723 2.099 1.718 1.458
10 dne dne dne dne dne 2.389 1.937 1.636
Note: The label “dne” indicates that such cutoff does not exist.
Source: Authors’ calculations
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 p n, A 
⁎⁎ and  Π n, A ⁎⁎ are increasing in  α while  p n, B ⁎⁎ and  Π n, Bi ⁎⁎ are decreasing in  α .
Note that  Y n 
α ( y) −  X n α ( y) = ( n − 1)(1 −  F  n ( y)) / f n ( y) > 0 for all  y ∈ ( 0, 1) . 
Hence,  y n 
⁎⁎ >  x n ⁎, that is the indifferent consumer is further away from firm A 
when A competes against specialists than when A faces a generalist opponent. This 
 immediately implies the following results.
COROLLARY 1 (Cournot complement): In comparison with the competition 
in  bundles against a generalist, bundling by a generalist who competes against 
specialists
 (i ) leads to higher prices by both the generalist and the specialists and
 (ii ) yields the generalist higher sales and profit.
Consider the case where consumers are uniformly distributed. Recall that for 
n = 2 , with generalists, bundling is profitable for firm A when  α > 1.415t and 
is profitable for firm B when  α > 2.376t . In the case of specialists, bundling is 
profitable for firm A when  α > 0.307t and is profitable for each firm B j when 
α > 2.092t . However, for  n = 3 , with generalists, bundling is profitable for 
firm  A when  α > 1.425t and is profitable for firm B when  α > 2.541t . In the 
case of specialists, bundling is profitable for firm A when  α > 0.093t and is 
 profitable for each firm B j when  α > 2.595t . Therefore, when B is separated into 
 specialists, it greatly expands the range of dominance under which bundling is 
 credible and reduces the rivals’ profits. Moreover, under bundling, the joint profits 
of the  specialists may be higher than when they are integrated. For instance, when 
n = 2 , for  2.092t < α < 2.376t , the joint profit of the specialists under bundling 
is higher than their profit under independent pricing, which in turn is higher than the 
generalist B’s profit under bundling.
Gans and King (2006) considers a model with four symmetric specialist firms, 
where a pair of firms can offer a bundled discount. This creates a similar Cournot 
complement effect, both within the pair offering the discount and the rival pair, 
increasing the profit of the former and reducing the profit of the latter.
Leverage when Competing against Specialists.—Suppose now that firm A com-
petes against two specialists as in Section V. Assume  t =  t 1 =  t 2 = 1 and  α 1 >  α 2 = 0 . We have the following result.27
PROPOSITION 8: Consider competition between a generalist firm A and 
two  specialists B1 and B2. Suppose that  ( s 1 ,  s 2 ) is uniformly distributed over  [ 0, 1] 2 
and  assume  t 1 =  t 2 = 1 and  α 1 ∈ (0, 3) and  α 2 = 0 . Then, pure bundling 
always  decreases B2’s profit and the joint profit of B1 and B2. In addition, for 
27 The proof is in Section B1 of the online Appendix.
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α 1 > 0.701 , pure bundling increases A’s profit; for  α 1 > 1.159 , pure bundling 
increases B1’s profit.
The proposition should be contrasted with the fact that if B1 and B2 are inte-
grated, tying is never profitable for A for  α 1 ∈ (0, 3) and  α 2 = 0 . Therefore, the 
proposition essentially captures the Cournot complement effect, which arises when 
the competing firms are separated. Then, for  α 1 > 0.701 , tying is profitable and 
reduces both B2’s profit and the joint profit of B1 and B2.
VI. Conclusion
We contribute to the leverage theory of tying by studying the leverage of a 
 dominant firm instead of a pure monopolist in the tying product market. We find 
that the dominant firm benefits from a positive demand size effect of bundling, 
which makes its bundling credible as long as the demand elasticity effect is not too 
 negative. By contrast, in the case of a pure monopolist, we find that both the demand 
size effect and the demand elasticity effect are negative, which makes its bundling 
not credible.28 We identify four different factors that allow a firm to  profitably 
 leverage its dominance in tying product markets to tied product markets where it 
is not dominant: asymmetric distribution of consumers, asymmetric transportation 
costs, multiple dominant products, competition against specialists. In reality, some 
of these forces can coexist. For instance, when a channel conglomerate bundles 
 several strong channels with some weak ones against multiple small rivals, the last 
two forces are combined to make bundling credible and powerful. Our findings 
 provide a justification for the use of contractual bundling for foreclosure purposes.
Appendix A
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
 (i ) The condition of the proposition implies that  lim x→1  X α ( x ) < 1 , so that the 
fixed point  x ⁎ (α) is smaller than  1 .
  Now we show that  x ⁎ (α) is increasing and concave for  α ≥ 0 . By taking the 
derivative with respect to  α on both sides of the equation  X α ( x ⁎ (α)) =  x ⁎ (α) , 
one obtains immediately
  
d x ⁎ (α) _____
dα =  σ  ____________________ 3 +  1 − 2F( x ⁎ (α))  __________
f ( x ⁎ (α))  
f ′( x ⁎ (α)) ______
f ( x ⁎ (α)) 
. 
28 See our working paper Hurkens, Jeon, and Menicucci (2016) for the analysis.
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  Moreover, it follows that  d x ⁎ (α)/dα is a strictly positive and weakly decreas-
ing  function of  α : first note that both  (1 − 2F( x )) / f ( x ) and  f ′( x ) / f ( x ) are 
 nonpositive for  x ≥ 1 / 2 . Next observe that both functions are decreasing 
because of  log-concavity of  f . The product of these two functions is thus 
positive and increasing. Since  x ⁎ (α) is increasing in  α ,  d x ⁎ (α)/dα must be 
decreasing.
  Next, the equilibrium price of firm A is increasing in  α because  x ⁎ (α) is 
 increasing in  α and  F(x) / f ( x ) is increasing in  x by log-concavity. The 
 equilibrium profit of firm A is then also increasing because both equilibrium 
price (as seen above) and market share ( F(  x ⁎ (α)) ) are increasing. Similarly, 
the  equilibrium price and profit for firm B are decreasing.
 (ii) In this case, no interior equilibrium exists. Necessarily,  p B ⁎ = 0 and firm A 
corners the market. The highest price to corner the market, given  p B 
⁎ = 0 , is 
p A 
⁎ = α − 1/(2σ) . Clearly firm A has no incentive to set a lower price (as 
demand cannot be increased). Firm A has also no incentive to increase its 
price because the marginal profit, evaluated at  p A 
⁎ , equals
  
d π A  _
d p A 
= F(1) − σ  p A ⁎  f (1) ≤ 0, 
  where the inequality follows directly from  (σα − 1 / 2) f (1) ≥ 1 . By 
 virtue of the remark in footnote 13, it follows that  d π A / d p A < 0 for any 
 p A >  p A ⁎ . ∎
A2. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 and therefore omitted. 
A3. Proof of Lemma 1
PROOF OF (i):
We first show the result for  n = 2 . Note that
(A1)  f 2 (1 / 2) = 2 ∫ 0 1 f  (s) 2 ds = 4 ∫ 0 1/2 f  (s) 2 ds > 4 ∫ 1/4 1/2 f  (s) 2 ds. 
Next, observe that for a log-concave function  f we have  log[ f (a) f (b)] 
= log[ f (a)] + log[ f (b)] ≤ 2log[ f ((a + b) / 2)] = log[ f  ((a + b) / 2) 2 ] for any  a 
and  b in  (0, 1) , hence
(A2)  f (a) f (b) ≤ f  ( a + b _____2 ) 
2
 . 
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In particular, taking  b = 1 / 2 and  a = 2s − 1 / 2 in (A2) yields 
 f  (s) 2 ≥ f (2s − 1 / 2) f (1 / 2) for  s > 1 / 4 . And thus
 ∫ 1/4 1/2 f  (s) 2 ds ≥ f (1 / 2) ∫ 1/4 1/2 f (2s − 1 / 2) ds = f (1 / 2) ∫ 0 1/2  1 _2 f ( y)𝑑y = f (1 / 2) / 4. 
Combining this with (A1), we obtain  f 2 (1 / 2) > f (1 / 2) .
In order to prove the result for  n > 2 , recall that  F j is more peaked than 
 F j−1 for each  j ≥ 2 , hence  F j ( x ) >  F j−1 ( x ) for each  x ∈ (1 / 2, 1) . 
Since  F j (1 / 2) =  F j−1 (1 / 2) , it follows that  f j (1 / 2) ≥  f j−1 (1 / 2) . Hence, we 
 conclude that  f j (1 / 2) ≥  f 2 (1 / 2) > f (1 / 2) for each  j ≥ 2 . ∎
PROOF OF (ii):
We denote the  i th derivative of a function  g by  g (i ) , such that  g (0) = g . 
For  j ≥ 2 , let  k  j ≥ 1 be such that  f j (i ) (1) = 0 for  i = 0, 1, … ,  k j − 1 and 
 f j 
 ( k j )  (1) ≠ 0 . Regarding  j = 1 , we define  k 1 as  k j above if  f (1) = 0 ; we define 
k 1 = 0 if  f (1) > 0 . We will prove that  k j+1 =  k j +  k 1 + 1 for all  j ≥ 1 . 
By L’Hôpital’s rule, this implies  lim x ↑ 1  f j+1 ( x ) / f j ( x ) = 0 for each  j ≥ 1 , hence 
lim x ↑ 1  f n ( x ) / f ( x ) = 0 .
We have that
  f j+1 ( x ) =  ∫ ( j+1)x−j 1   j + 1 _j f (s)  f j ( ( j + 1) x − s  ________j ) ds ,
hence,
  f j+1  (i) ( x ) =  ∫  ( j+1) x−j 1  ( j + 1 _____j ) 
i+1
 f (s)  f j (i) ( ( j + 1) x − s ________j ) ds 
and  f j+1 (i) (1) = 0 for  i = 1, … ,  k j . However, for  m ≥ 1 we find
  f j+1 




 ( j + 1) m−h+1  ( j + 1 _j ) 
 k j +h
  f  (m−h) (( j + 1) x − j )  f j  ( k j +h−1)  (1) 
 +  ∫ ( j+1)x−j 1 ( j + 1 _j ) 
 k j +m+1
 f (s)  f j ( k j +m) ( ( j + 1) x − s ________j ) ds .
Hence,
  f j+1 




  ( j + 1) m−h+1  ( j + 1 _____j ) 
 k j +h
  f  (m−h) (1)  f j  ( k j +h−1)  (1) 
and  f j+1 
 ( k j +m)  (1) = 0 if  m ≤  k 1 , but  f  j+1  ( k j + k 1 +1)  (1) = − ( j + 1)  k 1 +1 ( j + 1 _j )   k j +1 f  ( k 1 ) (1) 
 × f j  ( k j )  (1) ≠ 0 . Therefore  k j+1 =  k j +  k 1 + 1 . ∎
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A4. Proof of Lemma 2
We start by defining several dominance level sets.
DEFINITION 1: 
 (i)   MS + =  {α ≥ 0 :  F  n ( x n ⁎(α)) ≥ F  ( x ⁎ (α)) } ;
 (ii)   πA + =  {α ≥ 0 :  Π n, A ⁎ (α) ≥ n π A ⁎(α)} ;
 (iii)   πB + =  {α ≥ 0  :  Π n, B ⁎ (α) ≥ n π B ⁎ (α)} ;
 (iv)   DENS + =  {α ≥ 0 :  f n ( x n ⁎(α)) ≥ f  ( x ⁎ (α)) } ;
 (v)   PA + =  {α ≥ 0 :  P n, A ⁎ (α) ≥ n p A ⁎(α)} ;
 (vi)   PB + =  {α ≥ 0 :  P n, B ⁎ (α) ≥ n p B ⁎ (α)} .
Let furthermore   K − = [0, ∞) \  K + for  K ∈ { MS, πA, πB, DENS } .
Lemma 2 is equivalent to the following strict superset relations between various 
dominance level sets:
(A3)   πA + ⊃   πB + ⊃   MS − . 
We below prove (A3). The proof consists of several steps. In Step 1, we prove that 
both firms gain from bundling for dominance levels for which firm A obtains lower 
market share under bundling. In Step 2, we prove the weak set relations  of (A3) for 
dominance levels for which firm A obtains higher market share under bundling. In 
Step 3, we prove the strictness of the set relations. This is easy in case  f (1) > 0 , but 
requires additional Steps 3a and 3b in case  f (1) = 0 .
Step 1: We first establish that if the dominance level belongs to   MS − , then 
both firms will set higher total prices and obtain higher profits under bundling. 
Let  α – ∈   MS − be such a dominance level, that is  F n ( x n ⁎( α – )) < F( x ⁎ ( α – )) . As the dis-
tribution of the average location is more peaked, this implies that  x ⁎ ( α – ) >  x n ⁎( α – ) . 
From (2) and (5) we know that for any  α such that  (σα − 1 / 2) f (1) < 1 , we have29
(A4)  x n ⁎(α ) −  x ⁎ (α ) =  1 − 2 F n ( x n 
⁎(α ))  _____________
 f n ( x n ⁎(α )) −  
1 − 2F( x ⁎ (α))  ____________
f ( x ⁎ (α )) . 
29 If  (σ α – − 1 / 2) f (1) ≥ 1 , then Proposition 1(ii) applies and thus  Π n, B ⁎ ( α – ) > n π B ⁎( α – ) = 0 , 
 P n, B 
⁎ ( α – ) > n p B ⁎( α – ) = 0 . Minor changes to the arguments below establish that  Π n, A ⁎ ( α – ) > n π A ⁎( α – ) , 
 P n, A 
⁎ ( α – ) > n p A ⁎( α – ) .
VOL. 11 NO. 3 27HURKENS ET AL.: DOMINANCE AND COMPETITIVE BUNDLING
In particular, for  α – , the left-hand side of (A4) is negative. Equation (A4) can 
then only hold if  f n ( x n ⁎( α – )) < f ( x ⁎ ( α – )) . That is,  α – ∈   DENS − . Using the expres-
sions for  equilibrium prices of firm B from Propositions 1 and 2, we conclude that 
 P n, B 
⁎ ( α – ) > n p B ⁎ ( α – ) . As firm B also obtains higher market share under bundling, 
firm B’s profit is higher under bundling as well. Now firm A could set bundle price 
P n, A = n p A ⁎ and obtain higher market share, and thus higher profits than what he 
obtains in the independent pricing equilibrium. The optimal bundle price for firm 
A yields at least as much profit. As we know that in equilibrium firm A obtains less 
market share than under independent pricing, the optimal bundle price must be such 
that  P n, A 
⁎ ( α – ) > n p A ⁎( α – ) .
Step 2:  Next we focus on dominance levels for which firm A obtains higher 
 market share under bundling, that is  α ∈   MS + . We will show that
  (  πA + ∩   MS + ) ⊇ (  PA + ∩   MS + ) ⊇ (  DENS − ∩   MS + ) ⊇ (  PB + ∩   MS + ) 
 ⊇ (  πB + ∩   MS + ). 
It is straightforward that   πA + ∩   MS + ⊇   PA + ∩   MS + . Namely, for 
 dominance  levels for which firm A sets higher total price and obtains 
higher  market  share  under bundling, profits are automatically higher under 
bundling.
Note that for  α ∈   DENS − ∩   MS + ,
  P n, A 
⁎ = n F n ( x n ⁎(α )) / (σ f n ( x n ⁎(α ))) > nF( x ⁎ (α )) / (σ f ( x ⁎ (α ))) = n p A ⁎ , 
because the numerator is larger (and positive) and the  denominator is 
strictly smaller (but positive) on the left-hand side. This shows that 
  PA + ∩   MS + ⊇   DENS − ∩   MS + .
Note that for  α ∈   DENS + ∩   MS + ,  P n, B ⁎ = n(1 −  F  n ( x n ⁎(α))) /( σ  f n ( x n ⁎(α))) ≤ n(1 − F( x ⁎ (α))) / (σf ( x ⁎ (α ))) = n p B ⁎ , because the numerator is smaller (and positive) and the denominator is larger (and positive) on the left-hand side. 
Moreover,  the inequality must be strict. Namely, the inequality could only be 
 binding  when  both  f ( x ⁎ (α )) =  f n ( x n ⁎(α )) and  F( x ⁎ (α )) = F( x n ⁎(α )) . But this 
would imply that  x ⁎ (α ) =  x n ⁎(α ) because of (A4). However, this is incompatible 
with  F( x ⁎ (α )) =  F  n ( x n ⁎(α )) because  F  n ( x ) > F( x ) for any  x ∈ (1 / 2, 1) . This 
proves that   DENS − ∩   MS + ⊇   PB + ∩   MS + .
It is straightforward that   PB + ∩   MS + ⊇   πB + ∩   MS + . Namely, for dominance 
levels for which firm B obtains higher total profit under bundling, despite having 
smaller market share under bundling, it must be that the total price is higher under 
bundling.
Step 3: We show that the set relations are strict. We know that 
 f n ( x n ⁎(0)) > f ( x ⁎ (0)) , but if  f (1) > 0 and  α ≥ 1 / (σf (1)) + 1 / (2σ) , then 
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 necessarily  f n ( x n ⁎(α )) < f (1) = f ( x ⁎ (α )) .30 There must then exist a level α DENS > 0 for which  f n ( x n ⁎( α DENS )) = f ( x ⁎ ( α DENS )) . In the hypothetical case 
that there exist multiple such levels, we choose the maximal one. We claim that 
 α DENS ∈   MS + ∩   πA + ∩   πB − .
It is clear that  α DENS ∈   MS + . Namely, suppose it is not true. Then firm  B has 
strictly higher market share under bundling, and thus both firms would obtain higher 
profits under bundling (from Step 1). However,  f ( x ⁎ ( α DENS )) =  f n ( x n ⁎( α DENS )) and 
F( x ⁎ ( α DENS )) >  F  n ( x n ⁎( α DENS )) contradict  Π n, A ⁎ ( α DENS ) > n π A ⁎( α DENS ) (from 
Propositions 1 and 2).
Using again Propositions 1 and 2, it easily follows that  α DENS ∈   πA + . It must 
also be true that firm B has strictly lower profits under bundling. Namely, profits for 
firm  B could at best be equal under bundling, but this would require that firm  B ’s 
market share is exactly the same under both pricing regimes. We have already seen 
before that this is impossible as it would imply that  x n 
⁎ ( α DENS ) =  x ⁎ ( α DENS ) by 
equation (A4), and thus  F  n ( x ) = F( x ) for  x =  x n ⁎( α DENS ) . This thus proves the 
strictness of the first superset relation.
In order to prove the second, let  α MS > 0 be such that market shares of the 
2 firms are equal under both regimes, that is,  F( x ⁎ ( α MS )) =  F n ( x ⁎ ( α MS )) . Such a 
level exists if  f (1) > 0 as firm B has a strictly lower market share under  bundling 
for small positive dominance levels, while for  α ≥ 1 / (σ f (1)) + 1 / (2σ) his  market 
share  is 0 under independent pricing (Proposition 1) but positive under bundling 
(Proposition 2).31 In the hypothetical case that there exist multiple levels of domi-
nance with this  property, we choose the maximal one. We claim that  α MS >  α DENS , 
and therefore  f n ( x n ⁎( α MS )) < f ( x ⁎ ( α MS )) , which implies  α MS ∈   πB + even though 
 α ∉   MS − .
This follows easily from, on the one hand, observing that  α MS =  α DENS leads 
to a contradiction, as again by equation (A4) we would deduce that  x n ⁎( α MS ) =  x ⁎ ( α MS ) , which is impossible. On the other hand,  α MS <  α DENS is impossible 
because of the assumption that  α MS has been chosen as the maximal level of dom-
inance for which market shares are equal under the two regimes. It implies that for 
higher levels, in particular for  α DENS , market share is strictly lower for firm A under 
bundling. But we have already established before that  α DENS ∈   MS + . 
Step 3a: Suppose that  f (1) = 0 . We prove that for  j = 1, …  , n − 1 , we have 
 F  j ( x j ⁎ (α )) >  F  j+1 ( x j+1 ⁎ (α )) for large  α . It then follows that for large  α , 
 F( x ⁎ (α)) >  F  n ( x n ⁎(α )) .
Define the strictly increasing function  W j ( x ) = x + (2  F  j ( x ) − 1) / f j ( x ) . Given α > 0 , we know that  x j ⁎ (α ) is such that  W j ( x j ⁎ (α )) = 1 / 2 + σα . For a large  α , 
both  x j 
⁎ (α ) and  x j+1 ⁎ (α ) are close to 1. Thus, given  x close to 1, we select  y ( x ) as the 
unique  y such that  F  j+1 ( y ) =  F  j ( x ) . We prove that  W j+1 ( y ( x )) >  W j ( x ) for  x close to 
1, hence  W j+1 ( y ( x j ⁎ (α))) >  W j ( x j ⁎ (α )) = 1 / 2 + σα for a large  α , which implies 
30 We show below in Step 3b that if  f (1) = 0 , then  f n ( x n ⁎(α )) < f ( x ⁎ (α)) still holds for a large  α .
31 We show below in Step 3a that if  f (1) = 0 , then  F ( x ⁎ (α )) >  F  n ( x n ⁎(α )) still holds for a large  α .
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x j+1 ⁎ (α ) < y( x j ⁎ (α)) and thus  F  j+1 ( x j+1 ⁎ (α )) <  F  j+1 ( y ( x j ⁎ (α ))) =  F  j ( x j ⁎ (α )) for 
large  α .
To prove  W  j+1 ( y( x )) >  W j ( x ) , we notice that  F  j+1 ( y ( x )) =  F  j ( x ) makes the 
inequality equivalent to  (y ( x ) − x)  f j+1 ( y (x )) + (2 F  j ( x ) − 1)[1 −  f j+1 ( y ( x )) / f j ( x )] 
> 0 . We prove that  lim x ↑ 1 ( f j+1 ( y (x))/ f j ( x )) = 0 , hence
  lim 
x ↑ 1 (( y ( x ) − x )  f j+1 ( y ( x )) + (2 F  j ( x ) − 1)[1 −  f j+1 ( y ( x )) / f j (x)]) = 1 .
As in the proof of Lemma 1, for  ℓ = 1, … , n we let  k ℓ ≥ 1 be such that 
 f ℓ (i ) (1) = 0 for  i = 0, 1, … ,  k ℓ − 1 and  f ℓ ( k ℓ ) (1) ≠ 0 . Furthermore, we set 
 a ℓ =  (− 1)  k ℓ   f ℓ ( k ℓ ) (1) / ( k ℓ !) > 0 and  b ℓ =  a ℓ / ( k ℓ + 1) > 0 , such that  b ℓ <  a ℓ . 
Then use Taylor’s formula to obtain
(A5)  f ℓ ( x ) =  a ℓ  (1 − x )  k ℓ  +  η  f ℓ  ( x ) ,
(A6)  1 −  F  ℓ ( x ) =  b ℓ  (1 − x )  k ℓ +1 +  η  F  ℓ  ( x ) ,
with
(A7)  lim 
x ↑ 1  
 η  f ℓ  ( x ) _____ 
 (1 − x )  k ℓ  =  lim x ↑ 1  
 η  F  ℓ  ( x ) _______ 
 (1 − x )  k ℓ +1 = 0 .
Let  ε > 0 be close enough to 0 to satisfy  ε <  b ℓ <  a ℓ for  ℓ = 1, …  , n , and 
let  δ > 0 be such that for all  x ∈ (1 − δ, 1) we have
(A8)  | η  f ℓ  (x)| < ε  (1 − x )  k ℓ  ,
(A9)  | η  F  ℓ  ( x )| < ε  (1 − x )  k ℓ +1 .
Of course, if  x is close to 1 then both  x and  y ( x ) belong to  (1 − δ, 1) . From (A6) 
and (A9) with  ℓ = j + 1 we obtain
  ( b j+1 − ε) (1 − y )  k j+1 +1 < 1 −  F j+1 ( y ) < ( b j+1 + ε ) (1 − y )  k j+1 +1 .
Therefore  y ( x ) , the solution to  F j+1 ( y) =  F j ( x ) , satisfies
(A10)  1 −  F j ( x ) _________
 b j+1 + ε <  (1 − y ( x)) 
 k j+1 +1 <  1 −  F j ( x ) _________
 b j+1 − ε .
Similarly, from (A6) and (A9) (with  ℓ = j ) we obtain
(A11)  ( b j − ε) (1 − x )  k j +1 < 1 −  F  j ( x ) < ( b j + ε) (1 − x )  k j +1 .
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Combining (A10) and (A11), we thus conclude that
(A12)   b j − ε _ 
 b j+1 + ε  (1 − x) 
 k j +1 <  (1 − y (x))  k j+1 +1 <   b j + ε _ 
 b j+1 − ε  (1 − x) 
 k j +1 .
Similarly, using (A5) and (A8) we obtain
(A13)   f j+1 ( y ( x )) ________
 f j ( x ) <  
( a j+1 + ε)  (1 − y ( x ))  k j+1  
  ____________________ ( a j − ε)  (1 − x)  k j   .
We conclude that
  
 f j+1 (y ( x )) ________
 f j ( x ) <  ( 
 a j+1 + ε _ a j − ε ) (  b j + ε _______  b j+1 − ε) 
 
 k j+1  _ 
 k j+1 +1
 (1 − x)   k j+1 − k j  _ k j+1 +1 ,
which proves that
  lim 
x ↑ 1   
 f j+1 (y ( x )) ________
 f j ( x ) = 0 
because  k j+1 >  k j . 
Step 3b: Suppose that  f (1) = 0 . We prove that for  j = 1, … , n − 1 , we have 
 f j+1 ( x j+1 ⁎ (α )) <  f j ( x j ⁎ (α )) if  f (1) = 0 and  α is large. It then follows that for large α ,  f n ( x n ⁎ (α )) < f ( x ⁎ (α )) .
Given  x close to 1, we select  z ( x ) as the unique  z ∈ (1 / 2, x ) such that 
 f j+1 ( z ) =  f j ( x ) . We prove that  W j+1 (z ( x )) <  W j ( x ) for  x close to 1, hence 
 W j+1 (z ( x j ⁎ (α ))) <  W j ( x j ⁎ (α )) = 1 / 2 + σα for a large  α , which implies 
 x j+1 ⁎ (α ) > z ( x j ⁎ (α )) and thus  f j+1 ( x j+1 ⁎ (α )) <  f j+1 (z ( x j ⁎ (α ))) =  f j ( x j ⁎ (α )) . The 
inequality  W j+1 ( z ( x )) <  W j ( x ) reduces to  f j ( x )(z( x ) − x) < 2 [ F  j (x) −  F  j+1 (z ( x ))] , 
and since  z ( x ) < x it suffices to prove that  F  j ( x ) >  F  j+1 (z( x )) . We know from the 
proof of Step 3a that if the equality  F  j+1 (z ( x )) =  F  j( x ) holds for  x close to 1, then 
f j+1 (z ( x )) <  f j ( x ) . In order to obtain  f j+1 (z ( x )) =  f j (x) , it is necessary to decrease 
z ( x ) , which implies  F  j+1 (z( x )) <  F  j ( x ) . ∎
A5. Proof of Proposition 3
 (i) Define  α ¯ = min   πA + ,  α πA = sup  πA − ,  α πB = min   πB + and  α – = sup  πB − .
 (ii) This follows straightforwardly from (i). ∎
VOL. 11 NO. 3 31HURKENS ET AL.: DOMINANCE AND COMPETITIVE BUNDLING
A6. Proof of Proposition 4
 (i) In the market for a single product  j , for a given location  x of the indifferent 
consumer, social welfare under IP is given by  W( x ) = αF( x ) − T( x ) (omit-
ting  v Bj ), where  T ( x ) = t ∫ 0 x z f (z ) dz + t ∫ x 1 (1 − z ) f ( z )𝑑z is the total trans-
portation cost incurred by all consumers in that market, and is increasing 
for  x > 1 / 2 . Likewise, under PB, given the location  x of the indifferent 
consumer, social welfare per product is given by  W  n ( x ) = α  F n ( x ) −  T n ( x ) , 
where  T n ( x ) = t ∫ 0 x z  f n ( z ) dz + t ∫ x 1 (1 − z )  f n ( z ) dz . Both  W and  W n are 
 maximized by the same location  x w = min{1 / 2 + σα, 1} , but the location 
of the equilibrium indifferent consumer is smaller than  x w . Precisely, the 
functions  X α and  X n α introduced in (2) and in (5), respectively, are such that 
 X α (1 / 2 + σα) < 1 / 2 + σα and  X n α (1 / 2 + σα) < 1 / 2 + σα . This 
implies  that  x ⁎ (α ) <  x w and  x n ⁎(α ) <  x w for each  α > 0 , except for the 
case of competition under IP and  (σα − 1 / 2) f (1) ≥ 1 , because then 
x w = 1 and  x ⁎ (α ) = 1 .
 (ii) Here we prove that  W( x ⁎ (α )) >  W  n ( x n ⁎(α)) when  α ≥ 0 is close to 0. 
First notice that  x ⁎ (α ) and  x n ⁎(α ) are both close to  1 / 2 ,32 and it is simple 
to see that  T n (1 / 2) > T(1 / 2) since consumers cannot mix and match;   
hence,  T  n ( x n ⁎(α )) > T( x ⁎ (α )) . Combining this with the fact that  α F  n ( x n ⁎(α )) 
and  αF( x ⁎ (α )) are both about 0 reveals that  W( x ⁎ (α )) >  W  n ( x n ⁎(α )) when α ≥ 0 is close to 0. When  α is large, we have noticed in the proof to part 
(i) that  x ⁎ (α ) =  x w = 1 , hence  W ( x ⁎ (α )) >  W  n ( x n ⁎ (α )) holds again.
  For the case of the uniform distribution with  n = 2 (with  t = 1 ), 
we know from Subsection IIIC that  x ⁎ (α ) = (3 + α ) / 6 and 
 x 2 
⁎(α ) = (7 + α −  √ _  9 − 2α +  α 2)/8 , hence,
  W ( x ⁎ (α )) = α ·  x ⁎ (α ) −  ∫ 
0
 
 x ⁎ (α )
 z dz −  ∫  x ⁎ (α ) 1 (1 − z ) dz 
 = − 1 _
4
+  1 _
2
α +  5 _ 
36
 α 2 , 
  W 2 ( x 2 ⁎ (α )) = α(1 − 2  (1 −  x 2 ⁎ (α )) 2 ) 




 z · 4z dz −  ∫ 1/2  x 2 ⁎(α ) z · 4 (1 − z) dz 
 −  ∫  x 2 ⁎(α ) 1 (1 − z ) · 4 (1 − z ) dz 
 = − 1 _
3
+  3 _
4
α +  1 _
8
 α 2 −  1 _ 
24
 α 3 −  1 _ 
24
α(2 − α)  √ _  α 2 − 2α + 9.
32 From the proof of Proposition 1(i) and (5), we also know that  d x ⁎ / dα and  d x n ⁎/ dα  are both equal to  σ / 3 
when  α = 0 .
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  Numerical analysis reveals that  W 2 ( x 2 ⁎(α )) > W( x ⁎ (α )) if and only if α ∈ (1.071, 2.306) . ∎
A7. Proof of Proposition 7
Given  y n defined in (7), the profit functions are
  π A =  p A n F  n ( y n ),  π Bj =  p Bj (1 −  F  n ( y n )) for j = 1, … , n ,
and the first-order conditions are
  0 =  F  n ( y n ) − σ  p A  f n ( y n ), 0 = 1 −  F  n ( y n ) −  σ _n  p Bj  f n (  y n ) for j = 1, … , n .
Given the equilibrium average location  y n 
⁎⁎ , if  p n, A ⁎⁎ ,  p n, B ⁎⁎ are the equilibrium prices, 
then  p n, A 
⁎⁎ =  F  n ( y n ⁎⁎ ) / (σ  f n ( y n ⁎⁎ ) ) and  p n, B ⁎⁎ = n (1 −  F  n ( y n ⁎⁎ ) ) / (σ  f n ( y n ⁎⁎ ) ) . Hence,
  y n 
⁎⁎ =  1 _
2
+ σα − σ ( p n, A ⁎⁎ −  p n, B ⁎⁎ ) =  1 _2 + σα +  
n − (n + 1)  F  n ( y n ⁎⁎ ) 
  ________________ 
 f n ( y n ⁎⁎ )   ,
that is,  y n 
⁎⁎ is the fixed point of (8). Notice that  (n − (n + 1)  F  n ( y))/ f n ( y) = − ( F  n ( y ) / f n ( y)) + n (1 −  F  n ( y )) / f n ( y) , hence  Y n α is weakly decreasing. Moreover, 
Y n 
α (1 / 2) > 1 / 2 ,  lim y ↑ 1  Y n α ( y) = − ∞ , therefore a unique fixed point exists for  Y n α 
in the interval  (1 / 2, 1) . ∎
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